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ABSTRACT
In 1901, six Australian states joined together in political and economic union, creating an internal
free trade area and adopting a common external tariff. This paper investigates the impact of
federation on Australia's internal and international trade flows by studying changes in the "border
effect" over this time. This is possible because Australian states reported intra-Australian trade prior
to 1901 and for eight years after federation. The results indicate that federation itself produced little
change in Australia's trade patterns, but that the border effect increased substantially between 1906










  The Impact of Federation on Australia’s Trade Flows 
 
I.  Introduction 
In January 1901, the Australian colonies joined together in a political federation, 
setting the stage for the formation of a customs union later that year.  As a result, all 
duties on intra-Australian trade were abolished and a common external tariff was 
imposed.  The economic impact of this dramatic policy change is an important but 
unanswered question in Australian economic history. 
The economic literature on customs unions suggest that a reduction in tariffs will 
create trade between partner countries and divert trade away from non-partner countries, 
with the effect on economic welfare being ambiguous.
1  Although the trade and welfare 
implications of a customs union can be evaluated with an applied general equilibrium 
model, the demanding data and parameter requirements of such models pose formidable 
obstacles to simulating such a policy change for early twentieth century Australia.   
However, it is possible to examine changes in Australia’s “border effect” for this 
period, i.e., the difference between its intra-national and international trade, as explored 
in a large literature started by McCallum (1995).  A unique aspect of Australia’s trade 
statistics during this period is that the Australian states collected data on trade with each 
other and with foreign countries prior to federation, and continued to do so for nine 
                                                 
1   See Pomfret (1997) and Lloyd and MacLaren (2004) for recent surveys of the 
economic literature on regional trade arrangements and customs unions.    
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years after federation.  These data give us a rare glimpse of how the country’s internal 
and external trade flows changed as a result of political and economic union.  
  This paper studies how Australia’s “border effect” changed in the years between 
1890 and 1909.  Section 2 describes the events leading up to the formation of the 
Australian customs union.  Section 3 examines tariff barriers before and after federation 
and data on Australia’s internal and external trade flows during this period.  Section 4 
presents the empirical results of a gravity equation model that permits the estimation of 
the effect of national borders on Australia’s trade flows for selected years between 1890 
and 1909.  To anticipate the main findings, federation does not appear to have resulted 
in any discernable shift in Australia’s aggregate trade flows.  However, the measured 
border effect increased substantially between 1906 and 1909, which may be related to 
the imposition of the protectionist Lyne Tariff in 1907.  Section 5 concludes the paper.   
 
II.  The Formation of the Australian Customs Union 
  The Australian states achieved a large measure of tariff autonomy in 1850 with 
the passage of the Australian Colonies Government Act by the British parliament.  From 
the 1850s until Federation, each of the Australian colonies was an independent political 
entity that was entitled to determine its own import duties.  While British colonial 
authorities had no role in setting the structure or height of these tariffs, they did require 
them to be non-discriminatory and uniform across all trading partners.  As a result, the 
duties had to be applied to trade between the Australian colonies.  The ban on  
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differential duties meant that the colonies could not give each other, or even Britain, 
preferential tariff treatment.   
  This ban on discrimination, in keeping with Britain’s strong belief in universal 
free trade, had the unintended consequence of preventing closer economic ties between 
the Australian states.  The imposition of tariffs on intra-Australian trade even became a 
source of strife and discontent.   Conflict between New South Wales and Victoria over 
the customs treatment of border trade along the Murray and Darling rivers was particular 
source of difficulty, but was far from the only problem.  Six intercolonial conferences in 
the decade after 1863 failed to improve matters and “at each the disagreement became 
more bitter,” according to Reitsman (1960, p. 6).  Indeed, in the words of one historian 
of early Australian tariff policy, “the history of the trade relations of the Australian 
colonies, it must be confessed, is a sorry record of intercolonial jealousy and strife” 
(Allin 1918, p. 1). “Provincialism” is a word often used to describe trade relations during 
this period.  
  The desire to eliminate these barriers to internal trade was a principal reason for the 
movement toward federation in the 1890s.  As the first Australian Minister for Trade and 
Customs said in parliament in 1901:  “Years and years we have struggled for Federation.  
Why?  So that the fiscal barriers which have so long divided the sister States should be 
removed” (quoted in Reitsman 1960, p. 11).  Of course, the negotiations leading up to the 
formation of the Commonwealth were difficult; New Zealand dropped out of the discussions,  
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and even the participation of Western Australia was in doubt.
2  Eventually, however, a 
constitution for the Australian Commonwealth was approved by voters after a second public 
referendum in June 1899.  The United Kingdom agreed to the arrangement in July 1900, and 
on 1 January 1901, the six states of Australia united under the federal constitution. 
  Under the constitution, the six states lost their tariff autonomy and all power to 
regulate foreign commerce shifted to the federal government.  Yet commerce between 
the Australia states did not become free of duty until a common external tariff had been 
settled upon.  The framers of the constitution did not attempt to determine the tariff, but 
left this to be decided by the first Australian parliament.  The constitution provided that 
“uniform duties of customs shall be imposed within two years after the establishment of 
the Commonwealth,” but it did not take that long.  The first common tariff was 
implemented on 8 October 1901.  As of that date, all duties on commerce between the 
Australian states were abolished.  A special constitutional provision permitted Western 
Australia to continue to impose duties on goods from other states for five years, with the 
duties declining by one fifth each year.   
 
III.  Federation and Australia’s Trade Flows 
  At the time of federation, the Australian states were highly integrated economies, 
with few formal barriers to trade except the tariff.  As Forster (1975) put it, “there were 
no barriers to the free flow of capital and labour, economic institutions often operated 
                                                 
2 According to one historian of the period, “For the majority of New Zealanders, 
federation with Australia did not make economic or political sense in the face of the  
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across several colonies and of course there was very close resemblance in language, 
laws, and social institutions generally.”  Federation removed a principal barrier to 
exchange between the Australian states, namely tariffs.  Over time, economic and 
political union also mitigated the influence of other policies that might have acted as 
non-tariff barriers between the states.
3  The combined impact of reduced tariffs and 
harmonized inter-state standards drew the economies of the Australian states even closer 
together. 
  The impact of the customs union formation in 1901 could be expected to vary by 
state, depending upon the height of its pre-federation tariffs.  The tariff codes of each 
colony were similar in the 1850s, but increasingly diverged after the 1860s (Patterson 
1968).  New South Wales maintained a free trade policy, eschewing duties on imported 
manufactured goods and applying tariffs almost exclusively on “narcotics and 
stimulants” (tobacco and alcohol) for revenue purposes.  Victoria adopted a more 
protectionist policy in levying higher duties on imports of manufactured goods to assist 
local industry.  The other colonies chose to be somewhere in the middle of this 
spectrum, with Western Australia tending more toward the free-trade end and Tasmania 
imposing perhaps even higher barriers than Victoria.   
However, it is difficult to assess the magnitude of these pre-federation barriers.  
                                                                                                                                                 
expanding British market.”  Quoted in McLean (1995, p. 175). 
3 As Pincus (1995, p. 58) put it:  “The new central government was given power over 
currency, coinage and legal tender; over banking, insurance, quarantine, corporations, 
bankruptcy, copyrights, weights and measures, posts and telegraph and the like; that is, 
over the ways in which the colonies had imposed non-tariff barriers on intercolonial 
trade.”  Other non-tariff barriers, such as different railway gauges, would take decades  
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Quantifying the impact of non-tariff barriers is inherently problematic, and even 
determining the height of pre- and post-federation tariffs is not a straightforward 
exercise.  Table 1 presents some rough indicators on the average tariff barriers of the 
states prior to federation.  The first column is the percent of imports that entered free of 
duty.  The second and third columns measure the average tariff based on customs 
revenue as a share of total dutiable imports and dutiable imports excluding alcohol and 
tobacco.  This last measure may be the best indicator of the average tariff imposed on 
goods that competed with domestic production because tariffs on alcohol and tobacco 
were often revenue duties which coexisted with domestic excise taxes.  Even if these 
measures do not provide a perfect measure of trade barriers, they seem to provide a 
consistent rank ordering of the Australian states in terms of the restrictiveness of their 
trade regime.
4 
As the Table 1 indicates, New South Wales pursued a policy of low tariffs, with 
nearly 90 percent of imports entering duty free.  After 1896, New South Wales imposed 
no tariffs on imported manufactured goods.  The average tariff on dutiable goods of 10 
                                                                                                                                                 
to eliminate.  
4 While the shortcomings of the tariff revenue as a percent of import value are well 
known, it may be the best available measure of trade policy.  As Rodriguez and Rodrik 
(2001, p. 316) note, “It is common to assert . . . that simple trade-weighted tariff 
averages or nontariff coverage ratios - which we believe to be the most direct indicators 
of trade restrictions - are misleading indicators of the stance of trade policy.  Yet we 
know of no papers that document the existence of serious biases in these direct 
indicators, much less establish that an alternative indicator performs better (in the 
relevant sense of calibrating the restrictiveness of trade regimes).  An examination of 
simple averages of taxes on imports and exports and NTB coverage ratios leaves us with 
the impression that these measures in fact do a decent job of rank-ordering countries 
according to the restrictiveness of their trade regimes.”  
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percent reflects the revenue raised from specific duties on “intoxicants and narcotics” – 
ale and beer, spirits and wine, opium and tobacco.  (Domestic excise taxes were also 
levied on domestic production of tobacco and alcohol goods, so the tariff was essentially 
the international extension of those domestic excises.)  Tariffs on other merchandise 
were only about one percent of import value.  By contrast, Victoria imposed significant 
duties on imported manufactured goods and its tariff on merchandise other than 
narcotics and stimulants was nearly 20 percent.  Tasmania allowed very few goods to 
enter the state free of duty, and average tariffs on merchandise exceeded 20 percent.  
Queensland, South Australia, and Western Australia had tariff rates somewhere in 
between the New South Wales and Victoria/Tasmania extremes.   
However, the average tariff measures in Table 1 could be misleading indicators 
of the taxes applied to the goods that comprised most of intra-Australia trade.  While 
Australia’s overseas imports consisted largely of textiles and other manufactured goods 
from Britain, Australia’s inter-state commerce consisted more of food, drink, metals, 
and agricultural products.  The tariff codes for these products were a complex array of 
specific duties and domestic excises that make it extremely difficult to determine the 
differential impact of tariffs on intra- versus inter-national trade. 
What about the level of the first common external tariff?  Forster (1977) suggests 
that the political compromise reached by the states in parliament was not between free 
trade and existing protection, but between existing protection and further protection.  In 
his view, the first federal tariff was substantially closer to Victoria’s than to New South 
Wales’s.  Forster (1977) concludes that “for the colonies as a whole the tariff was raised  
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considerably.”  One reason for the increase in the average external tariff is that two 
levels of government now had to be funded – the states and the Commonwealth.  A key 
part of the negotiation leading to federation concerned the division of customs revenues 
among the states.  The transitional arrangement required the federal government to 
return to the states three-fourths of all customs and excise revenue for ten years after 
federation.  Thus, the first parliament had a stake in raising a significant amount of tariff 
revenue because it only got to keep one quarter of the proceeds. 
Figure 1 depicts the average Australia-wide tariff (as measured by total state 
customs revenue divided by Australia’s total imports, similar to the state figures in 
Table 1) from 1890 to 1913.  This figure might give some indication of the height of the 
first common external tariff relative to existing tariffs.  From 1901 to 1903, the average 
tariff rose from about 20 percent to about 28 percent.  Not all of this increase was due to 
the federal tariff, however, because the cyclicality of this measure is probably 
influenced by the interaction of import price movements and specific duties in the tariff 
code.  That is, the increase in the average tariff after 1900 reflects in part the role of 
import price deflation in raising the ad valorem equivalent of specific duties, while the 
decline in the tariff from 1903 to 1906 reflects in part the impact of import price 
inflation in reducing the ad valorem equivalent of specific duties.
5 
                                                 
5 Australia’s import price deflator declined 4 percent between 1901/02 and 1904/05, and 
increased 13 percent between 1904/05 and 1906/07 (Butlin 1977, p. 81).  Because of 
specific duties, import price fluctuations also account for much of the change in the 
average U.S. tariff over time; see Irwin (1998).  
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The impact of Federation on the trade of the various states differs depending 
upon how the common external tariff compared to its initial tariff level.  For example, 
New South Wales did not levy any significant tariffs on intra-Australian trade, except on 
drink and tobacco.  Except for those goods, the customs union formation would not 
result in much trade creation with the other Australian states because New South Wales 
did not tax their goods prior to the union.  However, New South Wales was required to 
increase its external tariff considerably as a result of federation, and its imports would 
probably be diverted from the rest of the world to the Australian states.   
By contrast, Victoria did impose duties on imports from Australian states.  If its 
tariff was not changed much by the new common external tariff, then Victoria could be 
expected to experience trade creation with the rest of Australia because it abolished all 
duties on goods from other states.  The other Australian states with high initial tariffs 
also may have been in the position of enforcing a similar external tariff but abolishing 
duties on internal trade.  Western Australia’s trade might not be affected by Federation 
much at all since it continued to impose duties on intra-Australian trade until 1907 
(albeit duties that were phased out over that time). 
  Figure 2 presents one depiction of how intra- and inter-national trade changed 
over the period 1893 to 1909.  This measure of intra-Australian imports as a share of 
total imports for each state shows a slight decline for most states after 1895 until 
federation.  This decline may be related to the economic recovery from the severe 
depression in 1893-95.  As incomes recovered, foreign trade expanded at a more rapid 
rate than domestic trade (Boehm 1971, pp. 28ff).  Political and economic union appears  
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to be weakly associated with a reversal in this decline, but there is not a sharp change 
in the shares that might be readily identifiable with federation.  Tasmania experiences a 
slight rise in the share of intra-Australian imports after federation, but contrary to what 
might have been expected, there is not much increase in the share of Victoria’s imports 
coming from other Australian states.   
  While it is tempting to identify the impact of federation on trade by comparing 
Australia’s actual trade before and after 1901 (as in Figure 2), such an ex post 
interpretation is problematic because post-federation trade flows may be affected by a 
host of factors other than federation itself.  A decline in external trade relative to 
domestic trade after federation might be mistakenly attributed to trade diversion as a 
result of the customs union when in fact it might simply be due to the sensitivity of 
foreign trade to income.  Specifically, a major drought in 1902-03 resulted in a decline 
in real incomes right after federation that particularly affected the trade of New South 
Wales.  Unfortunately, this problem virtually rules out any direct comparison of trade 
flows in 1900 with trade flows in 1902 as a way of measuring the impact of federation.   
  Given the problems of a simple ex post evaluation of trade flows, and the 
difficulties of constructing an applied general equilibrium model of the Australian 
economy at this time, this paper takes an indirect approach in trying to assess the impact 
of federation on Australia’s trade.  The indirect approach is to estimate the impact of 
Australia’s political “border” on its trade by looking at the difference between 




IV.  A Gravity Model of Australia’s Trade Flows 
  In an influential article, McCallum (1995) exploits a unique set of data on intra-
provincial trade in Canada to compare the country’s intra- and inter-national trade.  
McCallum uses the popular gravity model of bilateral trade flows, which relates a 
country’s trade to its economic size and distance from trading partners, to provide an 
estimate of the implicit obstacles to trade created by national borders.  McCallum 
estimates the following equation: 
(1)  log (Xit + Xjt) =  ￿ + ￿1 log (yi) + ￿2 log (yj) + ￿3 log (DISij) + ￿ Dij + ￿ij 
where Xij is exports from region i to region j, yi and yj are the economic size (measured 
by GDP) of regions i and j, DISij is the distance between regions i and j, and Dij is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of one if regions i and j belong to the same country 
(i.e., an indicator of intra-national trade).  In this equation, bilateral trade is expressed as 
a simple log-linear function of two countries’ or states’ GDP, the distance between then, 
and a dummy variable for intra-Canadian trade. 
  Using data from 1988, McCallum finds that the coefficient on the dummy 
variable was 3.1.  Taking the exponential of this estimate yields the result that trade 
between Canadian provinces was 22 times greater than trade between the provinces and 
the United States, after controlling for distance and incomes.  This finding stimulated a 
great deal of research on why there was so much intranational and so little international 
trade between the countries even though formal barriers to international trade were very 
low.  (Subsequent work by John Helliwell and others find that the border effect was  
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only slightly diminished as a result of the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement that 
took effect in 1989.) 
  As Feenstra (2002, 2004) and Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) point out, 
however, this is an upwardly-biased indicator of the magnitude of the border effect.  
Because of asymmetries created by differences in country size, there is not one 
exclusive measure of the border effect.  For example, a given border effect will be large 
when measured from the standpoint of a small country, but small when measured from 
the standpoint of a large country.   
Anderson and van Wincoop (2003) develop a specification to estimate border 
effects that accounts for this difference and is more closely tied to economic theory.  
The appropriate specification (constraining the coefficients on GDP to equal one) is: 
(2) log (Xij/yiyj) = ￿(1 - ￿) log (DISij) + (1 - ￿) ￿ij + log (Pi)
￿  - 1 + log (Pj)
￿ - 1 + (1 - ￿) ￿ij, 
where ￿ is the elasticity of substitution in consumption between all goods, ￿ is the trade 
cost or implicit tax barrier to trade between countries, and the P’s are price indicies 
(“multilateral resistance terms”) that reflect, among other things, transport costs.  
Because the P’s are not readily calculated, country fixed-effects have been proposed as 
an alternative estimation strategy that leads to consistent (but less efficient) results.   To 
reduce the upward bias in the measure of the border effect, the dummy variable is 
switched to indicate international trade and not intranational trade.  As a result, their 
estimating equation is: 
(3) log (Xij/yiyj) = ￿ log (DISij) + ￿ (1 - Dij) + ￿1 ￿i + ￿2 ￿j + (1 - ￿) ￿ij 
where the ￿’s are indicator variables for state i and region j.    
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  The results from the Anderson and van Wincoop specification in equation (3) 
cannot be directly compared to those from the McCallum specification in equation (1).  
However, the two can be compared if the McCallum regression is recast by constraining 
the coefficients on GDP to equal one such that:   
(4) log (Xij/yiyj) = ￿ log (DISij) + ￿ (Dij) + ￿ij. 
This equation will be estimated along with equation (3) simply for purposes of 
comparing the results from the two approaches.   
  Sufficient data exist from the federation period for these equations to be 
estimated for Australia.  The intra-Australian trade and external trade data are from the 
annual statistical abstracts of the Australian states:  New South Wales, Victoria, South 
Australia, Queensland, Western Australia, and Tasmania.
6  These unique data, which 
give us a rare glimpse at a country’s internal trade pattern, were no longer published 
after 1909. 
A recurring question about these data is the extent to which they are 
compromised by goods in transit between these states but ultimately destined for other 
countries.  Both New South Wales (Sydney) and Victoria (Melbourne) received goods 
from other states in Australia that were to be shipped to the United Kingdom or other 
overseas destinations.  Fortunately, the export data for New South Wales, Victoria, and 
South Australia explicitly separate out locally produced goods from those of other 
Australian state whose goods were in transit to other destinations.  In addition, Tasmania 
                                                 
6 That is, the annual Statistical Register for New South Wales, Western Australia, and 
South Australia, and the annual Statistics volumes for Victoria, Queensland, and  
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presented data both on exports and exports by country of final destination (e.g., 
exports to NSW are large, but many were ultimately going to the United Kingdom).  
The main concern is for data from Queensland and Western Australia, as sources for 
these states do not clearly break out transshipments.  However, exports from these states 
can be matched with imports from New South Wales and Victoria, and it appears that 
Queensland and Western Australia did separate out transshipments in their reported 
trade with other Australian states.   
  Indeed, transshipment and reexports appear to be less of a problem with the trade 
data of the individual states than for the aggregate trade data applied by the 
Commonwealth Statisticians starting in 1901.  As Boehm (1965, pp. 236-237) notes: 
“the understatements apparently apply only to the estimates of overseas exports and 
imports.  It appears not to apply to the series of imports and exports of each colony 
which include both overseas and intercolonial trade and which are particularly useful for 
regional analysis.”
7 
  A related problem is unrecorded transactions between New South Wales and 
Victoria across the Murray river.  Some assessments in the statistical publications of 
both states suggest that most trade between them was moved by ship or by rail, implying 
                                                                                                                                                 
Tasmania. 
7 Even so, Boehm shows that transshipments were only about 2 percent of recorded 
merchandise exports for Australia in the 1890s.  See also Boehm (1971), appendix 1.  
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that the magnitude of unrecorded trade was not substantial.  But there is no simple 
method to account for the fact that some river transactions went unrecorded.
8 
  The sources for the other data are straightforward.  Measures of real GDP are 
taken from Maddison (2003).  Maddison presents data for 20 countries with which some 
of the larger Australian states traded:  New Zealand, United Kingdom, Canada, India, 
Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Belgium, Holland (the Netherlands), 
France, Germany, Italy, Sweden, China, Japan, Java (Indonesia), Mexico, Peru, and the 
United States.  For Australia, real GDP is also taken from Maddison (2003) and 
apportioned to the various states based on the GDP shares in Cashin (1995).  Distance is 
sea shipping distance from http://www.distances.com.   
Equations (4) - the variant on the McCallum regression - and equation (3) - the 
Anderson and van Wincoop specification - are estimated for the years 1890, 1900, 1906, 
and 1909.  This gives us a picture of Australia’s trade well prior to federation, just prior 
to federation, and for two separate years after federation.  The year 1890 is about as far 
back in time that sufficient observations are available to make for informative results.  
Even so, in this year there are no observations for Western Australia’s or Tasmania’s 
exports as neither state reported their trade statistics in sufficient detail.  The year 1900 
is just prior to federation and includes observations from all states.  Ideally, one would 
like to examine the year 1902 as the year after federation to compare it with 1900, but 
                                                 
8 In results that are not reported, a dummy variable indicating trade between New South 
Wales and Victoria was used to see if trade between the two states was smaller than 
might have been expected given the economic size and distance between them.  
Invariably, the dummy variable was small with a large standard error.    
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the best comparison years (1902-04) are affected by drought.  By 1906 the Australian 
economy had recovered and so that year is taken as the best representation of Australia’s 
trade after federation.  The year 1909, the final year in which intra-Australian trade data 
were published, captures the impact of the Australian tariff imposed in 1907. 
Table 2 presents the results.  For each year, the first column reports results from 
our variant of McCallum’s specification (equation 4) and the second column reports 
results from Anderson and van Wincoop’s specification (equation 3).  Given the 
importance of the British Commonwealth to Australia’s trade patterns, a dummy 
variable for trade with another Commonwealth country is also included in the 
regressions.  For 1890, the first column reports that the coefficient on the intra-
Australian trade dummy variable is 3.16.  Taking the exponential of this estimate 
suggests that intra-Australian trade is 23 times greater than trade between Australia and 
the rest of the world.  (This result is remarkably close to McCallum’s estimate of intra-
Canadian trade in 1988.)  In addition, taking the exponential of the coefficient on the 
Commonwealth indicator suggests that trade within the British Empire was 7 times 
greater than trade with the rest of the world.  As is commonly noted, these are 
exceptionally high figures.   
  The second column for 1890 includes indicator variables for the exporting state 
and for four importing regions (Oceania, Asia, Europe, and the Americas) and reverses 
the dummy variable so that it represents international trade.  How should we interpret 
the estimate of gamma as -1.55, representing international trade?  As Feenstra (2002, 
2004) notes, in moving from equation (2) to equation (3), (1-￿)￿ij was replaced by (1- 
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Dij), so equating these two and solving for the exponential of exp(￿ij) yields exp[￿(1-
Dij)/(1-￿)].  For cross-border trade (Dij = 0), exp(￿ij) = exp[￿/(1-￿)], and thus the impact 
depends upon the elasticity of substitution.  If we take ￿ = 5, then the estimate of exp(￿ij) 
= 1.47.  This suggests that the implicit border barrier between Australia and the rest of 
the world amounts to an implied tax of 47 percent.   
  However, this implicit price barrier is highly sensitive to the assumed elasticity 
of substitution.  With ￿ = 4, for example, the implicit tax rises to 68 percent, and if ￿ = 
3, then the tax is about 117 percent.  We lack any solid information on the elasticity of 
substitution between domestic and foreign goods for this period; it could be that 
Australian products were quite different from foreign (imported) goods, making for a 
low elasticity of substitution and a higher implicit tax. 
  We cannot use the estimate of ( to determine how much more trade there was 
within Australia than across the border, but its exponential is equal to the geometric 
mean of the border’s impact on intranational trade relative to international trade for each 
country, i.e., the average border effect for Australia and rest of the world (Feenstra 
2002, 2004).  In this case, since e
1.55 = 4.7, the average effect of the border is to raise 
intranational by a factor of 4.7 above international trade.  This clearly indicates that 
there was a significant border effect prior to federation.  
  The results for 1900 are more noteworthy than those for 1890 because they 
includes the trade of all six states, resulting in many more observations.  The results 
indicate a decline in size of the intra-Australian trade variable, suggesting that the 
degree of intra-state trade fell from 23 in 1890 to 16 in 1900.  Similarly, the magnitude  
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of the Commonwealth dummy variable falls as well.  Despite this, the implicit tax 
arising from the fixed-effect estimation indicates a slight decline to 41 percent (again 
assuming ￿ = 5).  The average border affect is little changed from 1890. 
  The real question is how federation changed this border effect.  The final four 
columns for Table 2 report similar regressions for 1906 and 1909, the last year in which 
the Australian states reported data on intra-Australian trade.  While intra-Australian 
trade exceeded external trade by a factor of 16 in 1900, it exceeds it by a factor of 22 in 
1906.  One would expect such an increase with the formation of a customs union.  The 
intra-Commonwealth indicator variable continues to decline relative to 1890 and 1900.  
However, in the Anderson and van Wincoop specification, the implicit border tax and 
average border effect are slightly smaller in 1906 than in 1900.  The implicit border tax 
is 41 percent in 1900 and 40 percent in 1906, while the average border effect falls from 
a factor of 4.7 to 3.9.  Given the similarity in the results for these two years, it appears 
that federation did not have a substantial impact on the “border” between 1900 and 
1906. 
  What explains the fact that internal free trade as a result of federation apparently 
brought about no significant changes in Australia’s trade flows?  One possibility is that 
tariff barriers were not a serious impediment to intra-Australian trade, while non-tariff 
barriers (such as different railway gauges) were not immediately affected by federation.  
Another possibility is that the high degree of capital and labor mobility between 
Australian states in certain industries effectively overcame any significant trade barriers 
and these factor flows substituted for trade flows even after the internal tariff was  
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reduced (Mundell 1957).  Unfortunately, the results here cannot shed light on the 
precise reasons why federation did not significantly alter Australia’s trade pattern.  
However, the results for 1909 are strikingly different from the previous years.  In 
the McCallum specification, intra-Australian trade is now 40 times greater than external 
trade.  In the Anderson and van Wincoop specification, the implicit border tax rises 
from about 40 percent to more than 70 percent, and the average border effect more than 
doubles, increasing from 3.9 in 1906 to 8.9 in 1909.   
The key policy change between 1906 and 1909 was the imposition of the Lyne 
tariff of 1907.  By all accounts, the Lyne tariff substantially increased tariff rates.  Shann 
(1930) reports that it roughly doubled duties and reduced the number of commodities on 
the duty-free list.  According to a League of Nations study, the average Australian tariff 
on manufactured goods rose from 6 percent in 1902 to 16 percent in 1913 (Anderson 
and Garnaut 1987, p. 7).  The year 1908 stands out as one in which the average tariff 
jumped noticeably, according to Figure 1.  Thus, it appears that a much greater degree 
of trade protection was adopted not as a result of federation, but as a result of legislation 
adopted shortly thereafter.
9 
The other significant change in the 1907 tariff was the introduction of tariff 
preferences for the British Commonwealth.  These preferences appear to have the slight 
effect of halting the decline in intra-Commonwealth trade that was evident up to this 
point.  These effects are all summarized in Table 3, which shows how different the year 
                                                 




1909 is compared to the other years.  These results suggest that the import tariffs 
imposed by Australia after federation altered its external trade to a much more 
significant degree than the act of federation itself.  Yet the difference in the border 
indicators between 1906 and 1909 is not statistically significant.  When the data from 
those two years is pooled with a year dummy and interactions with the year dummy, the 
coefficient on the border effect interacted with the year dummy (for 1909) is -0.45 with 
a standard error of 1.11.  Thus, one cannot reject the hypothesis that the border effects 
are the same in both years due to the imprecision with which those effects are measured. 
 
V.  Conclusions 
  In 1901, six Australian states formed a customs union with political federation.  
Although the removal of tariff barriers to intra-Australian trade might be expected to 
significantly alter the balance between the country’s internal and external trade, the 
share of intra-Australian imports rose only slightly after federation.  A gravity equation 
model suggests that there was not a significant shift in Australia’s trade in 1906 
compared to 1900.  
  However, the Lyne Tariff of 1907/08 significantly increased Australia’s external 
tariffs and the gravity equation estimates of the “border effect” rise sharply between 
1906 and 1909.  This suggests that Australia’s growing economic distance from the 
world into the mid-twentieth century was much more the result of its own external tariff 
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Table 1:  Estimates of Average Import Duties in 1900  
 
   
Percentage of 
Imports on Duty 
Free List  
 
Average ad valorem Rate of Duty  
    On Dutiable 
Merchandise 
Imports 
On all Merchandise 
other than Narcotics 
and Stimulants  
New South Wales  87.6  10.3  1.3 
Victoria  53.4  36.2  17.0 
Queensland  36.0  20.5  13.1 
South Australia  35.7  21.8  14.0 
Western Australia  37.1  14.8  9.3 
Tasmania 
 
9.0  24.2  22.0 
 
 
Source: Coghlan (1904), p. 284.    
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Table 2:  Estimates of Border Effects for Australia 
 
  1890 
 
1900  1906  1909 






















--  2.75* 
(0.75) 
--  3.10* 
(0.84) 








--  1.67* 
(0.57) 
--  1.36* 
(0.61) 





--  -1.55* 
(0.59) 
--  -1.55* 
(0.64) 
 
--  -1.35* 
(0.73) 




--  -2.04* 
(0.93) 
  -1.87* 
(0.56) 
 
--  -1.27* 
(0.70) 
--  -1.70* 
(0.55) 
R
2  0.56  0.70  0.54  0.62  0.54  0.61  0.56  0.64 
Fixed Effects  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Observations  66  66  118  118  113  113  117  117 
 
Note: For each year, the first column is the McCallum specification (equation 4) and the second column is the Anderson and van 
Wincoop specification (equation 3).  Robust standard errors reported in parenthesis. * indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent 
level.   
 
 Table 3:  Summary of Results 
 
  Based on McCallum specification  Based on Anderson and van Wincoop 
specification 





Implicit Border Tax 





23  7  47%  4.7 
1900 
 
16  5  41%  4.7 
1906 
 
22  4  40%  3.9 
1909 
 
40  4  73%  8.9 
 






















Source:  Vamplew (1987), series GF357, ITFC 23, ITFC 152.    
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Source: Yearbook of the Commonwealth of Australia, early issues. 